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ABSTRACT 
According to the classical view, an economy’s lender of last resort should 
be its central bank. For brief periods of time, the bank might suspend 
convertibility in order to provide the liquidity needed to support the 
domestic credit market. Recent experience of financial crises demonstrates 
the conflict between maintaining a fixed exchange rate and serving as a 
lender of last resort. The lesson of Sweden’s history of crises under the 
classical specie standard is that a transitional, capital importing economy 
has to pay closer attention to the specie standard rules than do capital 
exporting economies. While the Swedish central bank, for a limited time, 
could support the credit market within the limits of the specie standard, if 
the crises persisted support mechanisms other than abandoning 
convertibility were required. The solution adopted was to import high 
powered money through loans guaranteed by the Swedish State.  
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In his paper entitled ”The Lender of Last Resort: Some Historical Insights”, Bordo 
concludes that successful lender of last resort policies, on several historical occasions, 
have prevented banking panics.
1 Since banking panics are expensive, avoiding them is 
certainly a good thing. Unfortunately, supporting banks in distress also is not free. Trust 
in the banking system may be both more valuable and more costly to achieve and 
maintain in an economy with illiquid capital markets, since such an economy is likely to 
suffer from volatility both in the price and in the accessibility of credit. How the lender 
of last resort activities are administered and financed thus affects not only the banking 
system but the economy as a whole. This paper examines how such policies were 
implemented in Sweden under the classical specie standard during the period 1834-
1913.  
An important aspect of lender of last resort policy in Sweden was the Country’s 
poverty, which resulted in a continuous deficit in the current account from the 1850's 
until well into the 20
th century. Massive capital imports were essential to the financing 
of the industrial transformation and, thus, specie convertibility was also of crucial 
importance.
2 
The historical experience of lending of last resort under the gold standard in Europe, 
including Sweden, is generally described as being compatible with Bagehot’s classical 
prescriptions on the subject.
3 This implies that the country’s central bank, being the only 
issuer of high powered money, injected liquidity into the economy, even when so doing 
temporarily required abandoning the specie standard.  
The question posed in this paper is whether or not this method of supporting the 
capital markets utilized in strong economies also was applied in transitional economies 
such as Sweden? If Bagehot’s recipe for acting as a lender of last resort could be 
followed by any country operating under the classical specie standard without concern 
for the exchange rate, then preserving convertibility would not be a central bank 
problem. Phrased alternatively, the classical gold and silver standards were sufficiently 
automatic to be insensitive to pressures on convertibility.  
Taking account of the impact and importance of the specie standard leads to the 
straightforward proposition that transitional economies are more constrained with 
                                                 
1 Bordo, M.D. (1989) p. 22.  
2 See Eichengreen, B. & Flandreau, M. (1994)   4
regard to lender of last resort policies than are stronger economies. While an economy 
with a strong currency, such as Britain, was able to follow lender of last resort policies 
in accord with the classical prescription, this was not the case with Sweden. Instead the 
Swedish authorities had to find alternative ways of providing lender of last resort 
services, while still protecting the fixed value of a currency that lacked the trust foreign 
actors accorded to Sterling.
4    
This discussion leads to three questions: 1) Was there any gold or silver standard so 
trusted by international markets that any currency operating under that system was 
considered inherently stable?, 2) Were lender of last resort services provided according 
to Bagehot’s classical prescription? and 3) If not, how were such services financed and 
administered when defending the fixed exchange rate was the primary goal? 
The first section of this paper contains an analysis of the theory of lending of last 
resort lending. Swedish monetary policy under the classical specie standard is then 
considered. This is followed by an examination of how lender of last resort actually 
functioned during the nineteenth century, especially during the most severe crises. 
Finally the paper ends with a discussion of how its findings might contribute to an 
understanding of how lender of last resort can best be provided in a transitional 
economy.   
Lender of Last Resort in Theory 
An implication of including a fixed exchange rate constraint when formulating a theory 
of last resort lending is that there must be more than one appropriate way of supplying 
and administering such lending. What the optimal policy is can only be decided on a 
case by case basis, depending on the state of the economy. Arguably, the theory of last 
resort lending emerged from a particular economic environment and has changed over 
time as conceptual difficulties were encountered. According to Bordo, the concept of 
lender of last resort can be divided into classical and evolutionary approaches.
5 The 
                                                                                                                                               
3 Bordo, M.D. (1989) p. 20 
4 Bills of exchange denominated in Sterling were considered “as good as gold” or even better (Kenwood, 
A.G. & Lougheed, A.L. (1999) pp. 114-115). The Bank of England’s maintenance of the gold reserve 
was, according to Sayers, ”the nation’s and the world’s assurance that claims in pound sterling were 
convertible on demand into gold at a price fixed by law.” (Sayers, R.S. (1976) p. 28). 
5 In his paper, Bordo presents three views on lending of last resort: these can be classified as the classical, 
the evolutionary and the free banking views. Since the last of these argues that such lending is just 
another way that central bank intervention contributes to instability, free banking theory can not be said to 




classical and the evolutionary approaches are here discussed in greater detail. In 
addition, there is some discussion of what light the lessons of last resort lending during 
the 1980's and 1990's throws on the theory applied to the nineteenth century experience. 
The classical view on lender of last resort 
Bagehot, Goschen and Thornton are often viewed as the originators of lending of last 
resort theory.
6 In their eyes, a lender of last resort was needed in a system of fractional 
reserve banking. Preferable it should be the monetary authority responsible for issuing 
high powered money, i.e. the central bank. Ideally, this lender of last resort would lend 
freely, albeit at a penalty rate, to solvent, but illiquid, banks with the value of the 
collateral offered being set at pre crisis prices. 
It should be noted that the classic view of lending of last resort, being derived from 
the writings of Bagehot, was largely based on the English situation. Bagehot’s original 
aim was to create awareness of how the Bank of England, on the basis of experience 
from 1848 and 1857, could limit the banking crisis of 1866.
7 First as editor of The 
Economist during the 1860's, and later in his classic book Lombard  Street (1873), 
Bagehot gave expression to many insights concerning how the central bank should act 
to limit the spread of panics and crises resulting from a lack of liquidity and of trust in 
the financial system. 
Bagehot’s ideas have since been distilled into four basic rules: 1. The central bank 
should be the sole lender of last resort. 2. During panics, illiquid banks should be 
granted loans backed by any collateral that would be marketable under normal 
conditions. 3. The central bank should provide large loans and advances, but at above 
market interest rates. 4. The previous three rules should be clearly stated before hand 
and strictly followed during crises.
8 
There are two reasons why central banks often are labelled as the lender of last 
resort. First, the function of the ultimate issuing authority is to provide the market 
liquidity needed to prevent financial crises and collapses of the money stock. Thus, if 
there is a monopoly issuer of base money, it becomes the issuer a last resort by default. 
                                                 
6 For an analysis of the historical development of the concept of lender of last resort, see Wood, G.E. 
(2000) pp. 204-209.  
7 It is therefore somewhat unfair to criticize Bagehot’s views from a more general perspective. Regarding 
Bagehot and central banking see Rockhoff, H. (1986). 
8 Bordo, M.D. (1989) p. 25 Footnote 6. (From Meltzer, A. (1986) “Financial Failures and Financial 
Policies” in Kaufman, G.G. & Kormendi, R.C. (Ed) Deregulating Financial Services: Public Policy in 
Flux. Ballinger Publishing Company. Cambridge. p. 83), see also Goodhart, C.A.E. (1999) pp. 340-341.    6
Second, assuming an information advantage of the central bank makes it most suitable 
to be the lender of last resort. Most probably the central bank will be the first actor to 
realize that some bank is getting into difficulties that might trigger a general financial 
crisis. Thus, it is also best that the central bank possess the means to avert such a 
development.
9  
Bagehot distinguished between crises resulting from internal and those due to 
external drains. In the first case, the above description applies. In the latter, the central 
bank should intervene by raising the discount rate, thus preventing the outflow of 
reserves through the mechanism described by Goschen.
10 Since external and internal 
drains often coincided, raising the discount rate would both attract foreign capital and, 
at the same time, lay the foundation for lender of last resort activities. It was also agreed 
that discount policy was the central banks’ least harmful policy tool for decreasing the 
amount of money in circulation and thus restoring balance between the level of reserves 
and the amount of notes in circulation.
11 
As a consequence, the description of appropriate lender of last resort policy under the 
gold standard was closely related to the ”rules of the game” discourse. These concerned 
how central banks worked to maintain the classical specie standard, a context in which 
lender of last resort behavior played a natural role. In brief, the rules of the game 
concept prescribed that central banks should not act to sterilize the effects of 
international capital flows on the domestic business cycle.  
Although, lending of last resort tends to sterilize international capital flows, 
McKinnon described how central banks under the international gold standard were able 
to maintain convertibility while at the same time serving as a lender of last resort. So 
doing involved a number of actions. In addition to the basic rules of the gold standard, 
McKinnon listed two rules concerning lending of last resort. One of these was the so 
called Bagehot’s rule, according to which central banks facing a short run liquidity 
crisis resulting from an international gold drain were to lend freely to domestic banks, 
but only at a premium interest rate. The other rule stated that, if free convertibility 
between gold and the domestic currency had to be temporarily suspended, then the 
                                                 
9 Capie, F. & Wood, G. (1995) pp. 215, 223 
10 Bagehot, W. (1866) pp. 236-237, Bagehot, W. (1919) pp. 265-267, 270 “The notion that the Bank of 
England can stop discounting in a panic, and so obtain fresh money, is a delusion.” 




central bank was to restore convertibility at the previous parity rate as soon as 
possible.
12  
McKinnon thus acknowledged the existence of a conflict between adherence to a 
fixed exchange rate and acting as a lender of last resort. The same can be said of 
Bagehot when he argued that a thirty percent reserve cover for notes in circulation was 
insufficient in case of a panic. While a fixed exchange regime complicated lending of 
last resort, however, it also laid the foundation for how to do it. The traditional 
definition of last resort lending, derived from Bagehot’s argument in Lombard Street, is 
still considered the basis of how it functioned under the classical specie standard. 
Indeed, recent research also emphasizes that the classical approach, with the central 
bank being responsible for lending of last resort, is still the best recipe.
13   
The conflict between maintaining a fixed exchange rate and providing lender of last 
resort services was present also under the classic specie standard. Due to the strong 
position of the Sterling, the Bank of England might have had the ability to temporarily 
suspend the fixed exchange rate. Germany, with another strong currency, solved its 
lender of last problem in an alternative fashion, but that country also violated the rules 
of the gold standard.
14 
The evolutionary view on lender of last resort 
During the last thirty years, the classical approach to lending of last resort has been 
expanded to what, in this paper, is called the evolutionary view. Goodhart argued that, 
even in the absence of a government designated central bank, an expanding banking 
system will eventually confer central bank functions, particularly acting as the lender of 
last resort, on a single bank. The possibility of incurring credit losses, together with the 
right of the public to make quick withdrawals or to redeem notes, obviously makes 
                                                 
12 McKinnon, R.I. (1993) p. 4 
13 Wood, G.E. (2000) pp.222-223. Or in Wood’s words: “Reconsideration of the role of lender of last 
resort shows revision of it to be unnecessary”. 
14 Following the implementation of the gold standard in 1871 and the establishment of the Reichsbank as 
a central bank in 1876, Germany constructed a system of lending of last resort that operated outside the 
requirements of the specie standards. The Reichsbank operated a type of giro, or checking, system for the 
transfer of funds. Since these checks were non-note liabilities, the Reichsbank was not required to back 
them with reserves, the gold cover rules only being applicable to the issuance of bank notes. This giro 
system guaranteed the liquidity of the credit banks. The Reichsbank provided liquidity by discounting the 
credit banks’ holdings of bills of exchange, thus allowing these to functions as substitutes for Reichsbank 
notes. The discount rate was volatile, reaching high levels during periods of capital shortage. Nonetheless, 
this policy allowed the Reichsbank to function as a lender of last resort for the private banking system 
(McGouldrick, P. (1984) p. 313, Tilly, R.H. (1986) pp. 195-196).  
Kommentar: emphasizes   8
banks vulnerable to a lack of short term capital. The banking system therefore requires 
the special services of a central bank or, more specifically, of a lender of last resort that 
can support them in case of difficulties.
15 
The focus of the evolutionary literature has been on the practical difficulties of 
providing lending of last resort according to the classical recipe. Since the basic 
function of a lender of last resort is to overcome the public’s lack of trust, which is the 
principal cause of bank runs, Goodhart and others argue that even insolvent banks 
should be rescued. Underlying this view is an information problem: First, the borderline 
between illiquidity and insolvency is not as clear as suggested in the classical view. 
Thus the lender of last resort inevitably will face a difficult problem in deciding which 
actors on the credit market are worth saving and which are not. This problem is further 
complicated as the market value of a bank’s portfolio fluctuates with the business cycle. 
Second, bank customers are frequently unable to determine whether their particular 
bank is just suffering from illiquidity or is actually insolvent.
16 
In light of this information problem, and given the importance of trust in the financial 
system, the evolutionary view maintains that lender of last resort services should be 
available to all banks. In thus arguing that even insolvent banks should be assisted, it, of 
course, differs from the classical view.
17  
The question of moral hazard is one of the most intensively discussed problems with 
extending lender of last resort services to all credit institutions, regardless of their 
financial condition. If banks know they will be rescued, what incentive is there for them 
to administer their affairs prudently? Indeed, the protection offered to actors within the 
financial sector by the lender of last resort might even encourage the former to speculate 
and to take unnecessary risks. This, in turn, might actually precipitate a financial crisis.
18 
Bordo, however, pointed out that bailouts of insolvent banks were an exception, at least 
before the 1970s. Thus, lender of last resort services can be said to have been provided 
in accordance with the classical view during the nineteenth century.
19 
                                                 
15 Goodhart C.A.E. (1987) pp. 3-4 
16 Goodhart, C.A.E. (1999) pp. 343-344 
17 Bordo, M.D. (1989) pp. 9-10 
18 Bordo, M.D. (1998) pp. 16-17, Fisher, S. (1999) pp. 92-94, Freixas, X. et al. (2000) pp. 73-78. 
Goodhart argues that the prevalence of moral hazard is exaggerated and that it does not constitute a valid 
reason for refraining from lending of last resort (Goodhart, C. A.E. (1999) pp. 352-356).  




Lender of last resort and currency crises 
In theory, the central bank is the lender of last report simply because it is the ultimate 
issuer of high powered money. Thus it is perceived to be the only actor capable of 
preventing panics by injecting liquidity into the economy.
20 This holds true for 
economies with strong currencies. In a transitional economy, however, the domestic 
currency ceases to be high powered if the central bank’s commitment to a fixed 
exchange rate is unconvincing. Under such circumstances, high powered money instead 
is issued by the central banks in strong currency countries. If the central bank in a 
transitional economy spends enough reserves by acting as a lender of last resort so as to 
put the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate into doubt, then the public will exchange 
its domestic currency for reserves, i.e. for the more stable foreign currency.
21 An 
advance announcement by the central bank that it intends to support the banking system 
within the guidelines of the classical system might make its commitment to a fixed 
exchange rate less trustworthy. 
The experience of the more recent bank crises of the 1980's and 1990's, also points to 
the key problem examined in this paper: how to provide lender of last resort services 
with a fixed exchange rate in an emerging economy. Briefly put, this experience 
suggests that there is indeed an incompatibility between a fixed exchange rate and the 
central bank acting as the lender of last resort. This is especially the case for transition 
economies where illiquidity is a major concern. If the central bank acts as the lender of 
last resort, a banking crisis involving a run on bank deposits will be transformed into a 
run on the domestic currency. Thus, a fixed exchange rate leaves little room for 
intervention by the central bank, with the exception of reducing its reserve 
requirements. Even that, however, will put increased pressure on the exchange rate. For 
an emerging economy, the problem is double faceted: First, the fixed exchange rate can 
only be sustained with fresh foreign capital. Second, any doubts about the value of the 
currency makes access to international capital markets more difficult.
22 
The inherent conflict between serving as a lender of last resort and maintaining 
convertibility has been discussed, and even included in the description of such a lender, 
for the period of the classical specie standard. It has not, however, been presented as 
                                                 
20 The idea is that liquidity within a country only can be provided by the central bank, see Wood, G.E. 
(2000) p. 222. 
21 Fischer, S. (1999) p. 94, Goodhart, C.A.E. (1999) pp. 348-352 
22 Chang, R. & Velasco, A. (1998) pp. 2-5, 35-39, see also Eichengreen, B. (2000).   10
part of the reality facing vulnerable economies. This may partly be the case because a 
currency crisis is generally defined as one that forces the currency off its pegged value 
or, if it is floating, to depreciate drastically.
23 Since this did not occur under the classical 
specie standard, the assumption has been that exchange rates remained constant and that 
lending of last resort could be offered in accordance with classical theory. In fact this 
required that the exchange rate system was stable and that imbalances between 
economies were automatically adjusted to restore exchange rate parity, thus eliminating 
the possibility of currency depreciation. 
The argument of this paper is that principal features of late twentieth century crises 
do not differ substantially from the workings of the classical specie standard. The 
choices available for providing lender of last resort services in a small, emerging 
economy, such as that of Sweden in the nineteenth century, involved the same set of 
problems. If the conflict between lending of last resort and maintenance of the specie 
standard was a harsh reality, the fundamental question raised in this paper is if the 
classical theory on lender of last resort was followed in Sweden? If not, the question is 
how last resort lending was financed and administered during Sweden’s nineteenth 
century economic transition? 
Swedish Monetary Policy during the Nineteenth Century 
The ability of the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, to implement monetary policy 
was constrained by two considerations. The first was the monetary regime, that is the 
choice of a fixed or a floating exchange rate. The second was the state of the economy, 
that is the need for foreign borrowing to finance Swedish imports. The silver standard 
was re-established in 1834. It was then replaced by the gold standard in 1873, a 
monetary regime that was retained until the outbreak of World War I. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, Swedish trade, as represented by the current account, did 
not provide for the inflow of any foreign reserves. Until the crisis of 1857, capital flows 
affecting foreign reserves were principally trade related. Starting in 1858, after the 
Parliamentary decision of 1853/54 calling for accelerated Swedish railroad construction, 
                                                 




however, Swedish capital imports principally consisted of National Debt Office 
borrowing.
24  










































































Capital balance = imported capital
 
Sources: Lindahl, E., Dahlgren, E. & Kock, K. (1937) pp. 268-269, Schön, L. (1999), Sveriges Riksbank 
(1931) pp. 54-71  
Until the borrowed funds were required by the government, the National Debt Office 
invested then on the domestic capital market, often as loans to banks and other financial 
actors. The Riksbank reacted negatively to this policy, arguing that the fluctuations in 
the money supply resulting from the National Debt Office’s investments weakened the 
Bank’s ability to maintain the specie standard. Starting in 1876, the National Debt 
Office channeled most of its borrowed funds through the Riksbank.
25  
The question thus arises as to whether the international capital markets had such 
complete faith in the classical specie standard as an exchange rate regime that the risks 
of currency depreciation were ignored? As might be expected, investors on the 
                                                 
24 Flodström, I. (1912) pp. 812-815, Schön, L. (1989:1) pp. 19-20, Schön, L. (1989:2) pp. 243, 249, 255. 
The importance of foreign capital to Swedish industrialization has been a controversial subject. In 1947 
Gårdlund’s study of industrial financing during the period 1830 - 1913 concluded that Swedish firms had 
been largely independent of foreign capital. Only modest amounts of foreign direct credits were utilized 
by the industrial companies studied by Gårdlund (Gårdlund, T. (1947) p. 128). This result has since been 
questioned, especially by Schön, who pointed to the great importance of foreign capital to Swedish 
industrialization (Schön, L. (1989:2) pp. 238-242).  
25 Nilsson, G.B. (1994) pp. 258-259, Nygren, I. (1989) pp.192-211, RbFSP No 252 June 15, 29 1876, 
RbR No 429 April 15 1875, June 26 1876. In 1875, the Parliament “decided” that the Riksbank and the 
National Debt Office were to consult with one another concerning the dispersal of the funds.  This 
“decision” was reached after the Riksbank had pressured Parliament to decide which actor was ultimately 
responsible for the Swedish currency (see RbR No 429 April 15 1875).   12
international capital markets were just as concerned with exchange rate risks as they are 
today. Regardless of whether the monetary standard was gold or silver, all foreign loan 
contracts were defined in the lender’s domestic currency (see Figure 2 below). Thus, 
even in the nineteenth century, the monetary policy of central banks acting as lenders of 
last resort was the subject of great concern. 
Figure 2: Bond Issues of the National Debt Office and the Riksbank, 1858-1879 
Date  Lenders from  Total loan amount in denominated Currency 
Jan 28 
1858 
Germany  7.6 M Thaler, according to the German Coinage Act of January 24 1857 (§1). 
Jan 29 
1858 
Germany  9 M Hamburger Banko, set in (Cologne) Kölnische Mark Silver (§11). Loan 
taken by the Riksbank to support the credit market. 
April 1860  Germany (and 
the Riksbank). 
10 M Thaler (8.4 M Thalers Borrowed abroad), according to the German 
Coinage Act of January 24 1857 (§1) 
Dec 29 
1861 






2 M Livre Sterling. (§1). All payments set to be conducted in English currency. 
1865 Domestic  loan  8.1 M Mark Hamburg Banko, or 2.7 M Rdr Silfver Specie. (§1) Set in a fixed 
cours of Cologne (Kölnische) silver as standard. (§10) 
Dec 15 
1865. 
Germany  9 M Vereins Thaler Courant. According to German currency standard of 
January 24 1857. (§1) 
1868  England  1.15 M £ St. Swedish currency not mentioned. (§2) 
1870  Domestic loan.  40 M Rdr Rmt. 
1872  Domestic loan.  24 M Rdr Rmt 
May 26 
1874 
Denmark  12 M Rdr Rmt (of the 1872 year loan) (= 12 M SEK). Payable in Swedish and 
Danish currency (1:1) according to currency union of 1873, or gold bullion (at 





5.625 M German Reichsmarks according to German coinage act of December 
4 1871 (equals 50 M SEK). 
June 15 
1876 





1.5 M £ St or 37.65 M Fr. Fixed course set between £ and Fr (1£=25 Fr 
10centimes) for all transfers in connection to the loan. Swedish currency not 
mentioned. 
Sources: RbFP No 152 February 11, 24 1858, RGKLKO No 9060 1858 – 1879, RGKLKT No 9061 1858 
– 1872. 
The loan contracts reflect the view of the international capital market on different 
currencies. If a loan was placed in Germany, the principal and the interest payments 
were set in German currency and, consequently, the loan was denominated in that 
currency. If any of the lenders were British, even if German or French lenders were 
involved, however, the bonds were denominated in Sterling.
26 Not surprisingly, this 
                                                 
26 RGKLKO No 9060 1858-1879, RGKLKT No 9061 1858-1872. Ingress or §1 in all contracts. In order 
to satisfy the providers of the 1878 loan, the National Debt Office guaranteed a fixed exchange rate 




indicates the lenders’ preference ranking among currencies. The very real concern of the 
lenders resulted in the Swedish State, as the borrower, having to bear the exchange rate 
risk. 
The threat of currency depreciation clearly existed under the silver, as well as the 
gold, standard. Thus, the monetary authorities had to display prudence with regard to 
the exchange rate. Since the entire foreign debt was denominated in foreign currencies, 
Swedish currency depreciation would worsen the Country’s debt burden and, perhaps, 
even endanger its ability to repay the loans. In that perspective, the Swedish shift to the 
gold standard in 1873 served as a signal to foreign lenders and investors that, as a debtor 
country, Sweden was determined to honor its commitments. 
27  
The overriding objective of the Riksbank monetary policy at all times was to 
maintain the specie standard. As with any fixed exchange rate, it was secured by central 
bank reserves. As long as the note issue was limited to what these reserves could 
support, pressure on the fixed exchange rate was relieved. Thus it should be kept in 
mind that, in an international context, the prudence of central bank actions were 
primarily judged in terms of the preservation of an adequate reserve to note ratio. 
Clearly, a decline in the size of the reserves signalled the need for Riksbank action to 
preserve convertibility.
28 
By definition, if the money stock in circulation was too large in relation to reserves 
then either reserves had to be increased or the money stock decreased. The monetary 
policy tools available to the Riksbank all affected the reserve to money stock ratio. The 
Bank could buy or sell non-reserve assets. In principal these were to be sold to increase 
reserves, but they could also be sold domestically as money supply altering open market 
operations or abroad to affect the exchange rate.
29 The interest rate charged to discount 
bills, as well as the ones on deposits in and loans from the Riksbank, were changed in 
step with the business cycle. In times of increased demand for reserves, the Riksbank 
raised funds abroad, not in order to increase its note issue but to build confidence in its 
ability to redeem its notes. 
                                                 
27 See Eichengreen, B. & Flandreau, M. (1994) p. 11 
28 BaU 1859/60 No 2, 1867 No 1, 1870 No 3, Davidsson, D. (1931) pp.145-146, RbFP No 169, 172 Mars 
25, May 22 1875, January 15, 24 1878, RbFSP No 252 April 22, June 17, 25, July 12 1875 
29 In 1872 the Riksbank instigated a reserve fund outside of the reserves, consisting of secure assets, to be 
used when needed in an outspoken sterilizing manner (RbFP No 166 August 1 1872). From the 1840s, 
and especially from the 1870s, the Riksbank actively worked to affect the price of the Swedish currency 
by intervening on the domestic market for foreign bills of exchange, see Lobell, H. (2000).    14
Simply decreasing the money supply was not problem free since it required the 
reduction of credits to private borrowers. Nonetheless, throughout the period 1834 - 
1913, the Riksbank periodically intervened directly on the domestic credit market by 
“strangling credit”.
30 This deflationary policy thus was one of the options utilized 
throughout the period to protect the specie standard.
31 
Figure 3: The Reserves of the Riksbank at Current Prices (1000 SEK), and the 




















































































RBs total reserve in 1000's SEK
RBs total reserve in percent of issued notes
  
Source: Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 54-71 
As the above figure makes clear, the nominal value of the Riksbank’s reserves 
remained surprisingly stable during the period 1834 - 1901. The foreign loans that 
poured into Sweden starting in the late 1850's did not help to fortify the reserves for the 
Riksbank until the closing years of the century. By 1855 the economic boom of the 
early 1850's had allowed the Riksbank to accumulate a level of reserves that was not to 
be exceeded in nominal terms until 1901. Similarly, the boom of the 1870's allowed the 
Riksbank to increase its reserves. Conversely, the crises of the late 1850's and late 
1870's were both characterized by declining reserves and, contrary to the ”rules of the 
game”, by reduced backing for the notes in circulation.   
                                                 
30 Starting in the 1870's, the Riksbank attempted to decrease its note circulation by raising its interest 
rates, both on deposits and for discounting. Nonetheless, during most crises the Bank had to directly 
reduce its note circulation by cancelling credit (see Brisman, S. (1931) pp. 189-191).  
31 The politics of the time also made it possible to maintain specie convertibility at all costs in total 
disregard of the negative economic consequences of such a policy, including lower output and higher 




The Lender of Last Resort in Nineteenth Century Sweden 
The most obvious way the Riksbank could support distressed banks acting as a classical 
lender of last resort was to temporarily suspend convertibility through excessive note 
issue. As can be seen in Figure 4 below, officially this only occurred during the 1840's. 
In the crisis of 1843, the Riksbank can be said to have adopted certain lender of last 
resort characteristics since, for a period of two and one half years, it exceeded its legal 
note issuance limit by more than twenty percent.  
It is possible that the Riksbank unofficially followed Bagehot’s prescription for brief 
periods during other crises. These turned out to be too deep and too prolonged, 
however, to allow as great a reduction of reserves as the Riksbank had permitted during 
the early 1840's.
32  



























































































Source: Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 45-49, 52-59, 62-69 
A clear implication of Figure 4 is that sometime in the 1860's or 1870's an underlying 
change occurred that from then on made it possible for the Riksbank to maintain a 
higher level of unutilized issuance rights than previously. Although it is tempting to 
conclude that this change was the adoption of the gold standard in 1873, in fact this is 
unlikely. Rather, it seems probable that the increase in note issuance and lending by the 
private banks and the foreign capital imported by the National Debt Office made the 
economy less dependent on Riksbank notes. 
                                                 
32 The principal reason for the shrinkage of Riksbank reserves during the early 1840's, however, was not 
the crisis per see, but the forced redemption for silver of all Riksbank notes circulating in Finland  (see 
Davidsson, D. (1931) pp. 205-217 and Ögren, A. (2003) Chapter 5).   16
The National Debt Office supplied credit to the banking system from the late 1850's 
until the early years of the twentieth century. However, since it had to cancel credits 
when the State required funds, the Office did not function as a lender of last resort.
33  
The commercial banking system began to emerge during the 1830's, and by the 
1860's it had become nationwide. It depended mainly on note issuance until the 1860's, 
when deposits became its principal source of financing. Nonetheless, from the late 
1850's until 1900, more private commercial bank notes than Riksbank notes were in 
circulation.
34 
One feature of the Swedish note issuing experience that has attracted attention is the 
system’s reputed stability.
35 Unfortunately, however, this was not always the case. Some 
Swedish banks in fact encountered financial difficulties during international crises. 
Despite the fact that both the law and the bank charters explicitly stated that the 
Enskilda banks were not entitled to official assistance, some banks were helped during 
the unusually deep crises of 1857/58 and 1878/79. Consequently, these crises have been 
subjected to especially detailed study. 
Lender of last resort during the crisis of 1857/58 
Figure 3 above showed that the reserve holdings of the Riksbank reached their 
maximum in 1855. After that year, a decline set in during the late 1850's. Starting in 
early 1856, the Riksbank reserves and, as a result, issued notes decreased rapidly. 
Indeed, between December 1855 and all time low of the crisis in August 1858 the 
reserves shrank to a third of its original size.  
                                                 
33 Nygren, I. (1989) pp. 176-183. This happened both in the crisis of 1857/58 and in that of 1878/79. 
34 Ögren, A. (2000) pp. 33-37  




Figure 5: Monthly Data on Riksbank Reserves and Note Issue, January 1855 – 





























































































Source: Finanskommittén 1858, Vol I. 
In September of 1857, the crisis hit the Hamburg credit market, resulting in the 
widespread cancellation of Swedish credits. In order to restore trust, the Riksbank 
worked actively with the actors on the Stockholm capital market. The members of the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange formed an association to provide credit in cash or Hamburg 
bills on good collateral. Given the situation in Hamburg, no single firm could perform 
this service. The credit association established its own banking firm in Hamburg, the 
Riksbank giving it credence by buying and discounting its bills of exchange. In practice 
this was a domestic arrangement that served to maintain liquidity within Sweden. By 
establishing this firm outside of Sweden, the Riksbank was able to treat its bills as 
reserves. Thus, the Riksbank could support the domestic credit market without formally 
reducing its reserve to money stock ratio. These activities of the Riksbank, however, 
were criticized by the Standing Committee on Banking and by the Parliament. Besides 
lacking legal support, it was felt that they put the currency under unnecessary stress.
36 
                                                 
36 Davidsson, D. (1931) pp. 148-151, 155-159   18
Figure 6: Monthly Data on the Riksbank’s Total and Disaggregated Reserves as 































































































Source: Finanskommittén 1858, Vol I. 
Figures 6 demonstrates how the Riksbank tried to offset some of the effects of the 
outflow of reserves by reducing the backing of its notes below the peak level of late 
1855. The impact of the Riksbank purchasing bills from its own Hamburg firm starting 
in September 1857 can clearly be seen in its ability to keep notes in circulation. Despite 
the constraints imposed by specie convertibility, the Riksbank obviously had some 
room for manoeuvre during the crisis. 
The minutes make it clear that despite the determination of the Board members to 
provide sufficient liquidity to prevent credit market deterioration, issuing notes without 
regard to reserves was not considered a solution. Even so, the Riksbank’s actions during 
the crisis of 1857 took it to the brink of bankruptcy.
37 When four British trading 
companies with important ties to Sweden suspended their payments in November of 
1857, the Riksbank publicly declared its determination to support the credit market. 
Instantly seven hundred thousand of the Riksbank’s unutilized issue rights of one 
million SEK were committed to providing additional credit. Despite the drastic 
                                                 
37 Nilsson, G.B. (1989) p. 10. One member of the Board suggested that the Riksbank exceed its legal limit 
to issue notes by counting as reserves also the future interest to be earned on bonds the Bank held as 
backing for its notes. This proposal did not receive support from other Board members (RbFP No 151 




circumstances the Riksbank retained its interest rate at 5%, well below international 
levels.
38  
Much of the discussion among the Board members of the Riksbank concerned how 
the money supply could be increased without, at least technically, reducing the reserve 
cover. Some members argued for classifying all of the Riksbank’s assets as reserves. 
Another possibility for supplying money was to supplement the buying of gold and 
silver from the public with accepting these metals as collateral for loans, thereby 
finessing Gresham’s Law.  In December of 1857, the Board of the Riksbank effectively 
devalued the currency by paying an add on over par amounting to more than two 
percent when buying domestic silver. This higher price was justified as accounting for 
the greater cost of importing silver from abroad.
39  
While the National Debt Office injected liquidity on four different occasions during 
1856 and 1857, its cancellation of credits also had severe consequences. When the crisis 
was most acute in December of 1857, the Office’s only funds were a government grant 
designated for saving Skåne Enskilda Bank.
40 
The deep and prolonged crisis of 1857 illustrated the need for a State lender of last 
resort. The largest bank of the time, Skåne Enskilda Bank in southern Sweden, had kept 
increasing its lending until the summer of 1857, thus putting its reserve under increasing 
pressure. In October, the Bank turned to the international capital market in Hamburg but 
concluded that the eight and one half percent interest rate available was too high. In 
Stockholm interest rates were at eight percent and in Copenhagen they had reached 
fifteen percent. Skåne Enskilda Bank made do by utilizing a previously approved 
Hamburg credit and by obtaining a loan from Stockholm Enskilda Bank.  
In December, the financial distress deepened as all Swedish credits in the Hamburg 
capital market were cancelled. A general distrust of Swedish private bank notes began 
to grow, especially in Copenhagen. There Swedish bank notes were accepted only at a 
substantial discount reflecting their perceived riskiness. The problem was especially 
serious for Skåne Enskilda Bank. Not only was this Bank located close to Copenhagen, 
                                                 
38 RbFP No 151 November 19 1857 
39 RbFP No 151 December 10, 17 1857. The Riksbank included in its reserves silver and gold it held as 
collateral.  This was officially motivated by the borrowers having sold them to the Riksbank, subject to 
the right of repurchase by repaying their loans. 
40 Nygren, I. (1989) pp. 178-179   20
thereby increasing its note circulation in Denmark, it was the single largest note issuer 
among all Swedish private banks.  The result was a rapid decline in the Bank’s reserves. 
On December 5, 1857, Skåne Enskilda Bank turned to the domestic Swedish capital 
market but managed only to obtain two small loans from other private banks. With the 
capital markets in Copenhagen and Hamburg being closed, the Bank had no option but 
to call on the ultimate lender of last resort, the Swedish State. 
Two days later the Bank telegraphed the Minister of Finance threatening to suspend 
the redemption of its notes. Within three days, a hasty meeting among the Standing 
Committee on Supply, the National Debt Office, the Board of the Riksbank and the 
Minister of Finance had resulted in the granting to Skåne Enskilda Bank of a credit, 
guaranteed by the Riksbank, in the substantial amount of two hundred thousand SEK. In 
total, Skåne Enskilda Bank was provided with a credit of one half million SEK. It was 
collateralized by Mortgage Association bonds and a personal note from a Bank 
representative in Stockholm. The Mortgage Association, in turn, received the collateral 
Skåne Enskilda Bank held as backing for its outstanding loans.
41 None of these financial 
assets were sellable on the secondary market during the crisis. 
Just when the crisis reached is climax, the King and Parliament instructed the 
Riksbank to borrow the sum of twelve million SEK on the Hamburg capital market. 
Despite the prohibition of State support for the Enskilda banks included in the 1846 law, 
the Standing Committee on Banking primary viewed the Enskilda banks as the 
recipients of this emergency credit. The decision authorized the Riksbank to include the 
entire loan sum in its reserves as soon as the loan contract had been signed, with written 
instructions immediately to issue Riksbank notes to an equivalent value.
42 
To administer these borrowed funds, the Riksbank established a special State Loan 
Fund (Statslånefonden). The Riksbank was given Parliamentary permission to exceed 
the legal interest rate limit of six percent when lending these funds.
43 The resulting nine 
                                                 
41 Kock, K. (1931) pp. 162-169. The actual representative of the bank in Stockholm refused to guarantee 
the credit in person, instead the founder of the Stockholm Enskilda bank, A.O. Wallenberg, stepped in. 
See also Brisman, S. (1934) pp. 102-103, 105-106, Nilsson, G.B. (1989) pp. 9-29, Schön, L. (2000) p. 
165. 
42 RbFP No 152 January 7, 28 1858. Some Riksbank board members questioned the idea of supporting 
the Enskilda banks whom they blamed for the problems of the credit market. 
43 RbFP No 152 February 2, 4, 11 1858. In England it was said that an interest rate of 7% would draw 




percent rate, however, did not prevent the entire sum from being dispersed within a 
year.
44 
Since the fund was intended to support the domestic credit market, its loans were 
short term, repayable in less than three years. Meanwhile, the foreign lenders paid close 
attention to the exchange rate risk. The eleventh paragraph of the loan contract between 
the Riksbank and the lenders in Hamburg prescribed that both interest and principal 
were to be denominated in the Mark Hamburg Banko, and its equivalent in Cologne 
silver.  
This loan to the Riksbank was finalized on January 28, 1858, the day before the 
National Debt Office signed a contract for a twenty million SEK bond loan, not in 
Hamburg but in Frankfurt am Main. This latter loan was designated to finance 
construction of the Swedish railway system, but much of it became immediately 
available to the credit market and to the Riksbank. The very first paragraph of this loan 
agreement specified that the principal and all loan payments were to be fixed in the 
German Vereinsthaler, all other valuations of the Swedish currency being disregarded.
45 
Figure 7: Monthly Data on the Riksbank’s Unutilized Rights to Issue Notes and Foreign 




























































































Unutilized right to issue notes in percent of issued notes
Foreign Bills of Exchange in percent of issued notes
 
Source: Finanskommittén 1858, Vol I. 
                                                 
44 How this was done is not entirely clear. The Riksbank deposited the capital from the Fund in various of 
its own departments and branches. The General Ledger of the Fund does not reveal what happened to the 
Fund’s assets in Sweden. It began by placing seven million four hundred thousand SEK with the Deposit 
Department of the Riksbank between February and April. In its own accounts, however, this Department 
only reported one hundred sixty five thousand SEK from the Fund during the year. RbDA No 4352, Pag. 
1810 1858, RbFP No 152 February 4, 8, 11, 1858, RbSLF No 4812 Pag.306 1858, Pag. 306 1859, 
RbSLFH No 4817 1858. 
45 RbFP No 152 February 11, 24 1858, RGKLKT No 9061 1858 §1.    22
Figure 7 illustrates the efforts of the Riksbank to maintain liquidity by redeeming 
bills drawn on Hamburg. Since the Riksbank issue notes under a differential system that 
allowed it to issue a fixed amount of notes in excess of its reserves, the Bank effectively 
abandoned the requirements of the specie standard from December 1857 until June 
1858. This is apparent from the fact that if bills of exchange had not been treated as 
reserves the Riksbank would have exceeded its note issuing rights. The use of the bills 
was limited to bridging the time gap between the decision to borrow internationally and 
the arrival of the funds. Still, the question remains: would the Riksbank have been able 
to maintain the specie standard if the Riksbank and the National Debt Office had been 
unable to borrow high powered money abroad? 
In the aftermath of the crisis there was Parliamentary criticism of the Riksbank. It 
was argued that seeking large foreign loans, by raising doubts concerning the 
Riksbank’s solvency, undermined confidence in the Swedish currency.
46 Perhaps as a 
consequence of this criticism, the Riksbank did not intervene to support the domestic 
credit market during the crises of the 1860's. Instead to stuck to its principal objective; 
preserving convertibility regardless of domestic credit conditions.
47  
Lender of last resort during the crisis of 1878/79 
The most severe Swedish financial crisis under the gold standard was that of 1878 and 
1879. Although 1873 witnessed the emergence of an international crisis, it was the very 
zenith of the Swedish boom. During these good years, the Swedish credit market 
seemed largely insensitive to the discount rate increases implemented by the Riksbank, 
and in September 1873 the Bank’s note issue exceed permissible levels. Instead of 
decreasing the money supply, however, the Bank increased its reserves by dipping into 
the reserve fund. Since these assets largely consisted of National Debt Office Bonds that 
were sold abroad, thus bringing in fresh capital, the effect was further credit market 
expansion.
48 
While the economy boomed, the banks extended credit freely. The favorite 
investment vehicle of the time was private railway bonds. These were issued to finance 
the construction of private railways that connected to the principal State owned 
                                                 
46 Davidsson, D. (1931) pp. 163, 166-167 
47 Davidsson, D. (1931) pp. 136, 147-150, 155-158, 163, 166-167 see also Ögren, A. (2000) p. 95 note 43. 
48 RbFP No 167 June 5, September 18, October 23, 25 1873, RbFSP No 251 September 25 1873, see also 




network. As a result, these bonds become one of the major components of private bank 
portfolios.
49 
As the economy slid into recession in 1875, the private railway bonds rapidly 
depreciated to half their nominal value. The greater the share of bonds in a bank’s 
holdings, the greater the doubts about its solvency. One of the best known and highly 
respected private banking firms, C.G. Cervin was forced by it large railroad bond 
portfolio to suspend payments as early as 1875.
50 
From the start of the recession in January of 1875 until final crisis, the Riksbank 
actively supported the credit market within the constraints of the specie standard. When 
the currency came under pressure in February of 1875, the Riksbank had to open a note 
redemption office in Copenhagen to prevent its notes from trading below par.
51 Despite 
increased foreign credits, raised interest rates and utilization of the reserve fund to bring 
in reserves from abroad, in July of 1875 the Riksbank secretly decided to decrease its 
lending and thus reduce the money supply.
52  
Discounting the commercial banks’ bills of exchange based on Hamburg credits 
affected the reserves of the Riksbank. In October 1875, the Board of the Riksbank 
discussed the possibility of ceasing to discount these bills. This possibility was rejected, 
however, since it would not only deprive these banks and bankers of a source of credit, 
but it also would undermine public confidence in the credit market. The Riksbank 
therefore continued to discount such bills, but at a discretionary lower rate of 
exchange.
53       
During the recession, the private commercial banks reduced their lending to such an 
extent that the circulation of Riksbank notes, instead of decreasing, actually increased. 
The Board of the Riksbank noted that this development helped support the domestic 
credit market but, since reserves had decreased, it could not continue. In December of 
1877, the Riksbank requested that the National Debt Office facilitate the importation of 
                                                 
49 Söderlund, E. (1964) p. 113 
50 This particular banking firm, although placed under bankruptcy administrator, was ironically one of the 
few to survive this crisis. 
51 RbFP No 169 January 20 1875, RbFSP No 252 January 14, February 18, April 22 1875. According to 
the Board of the Riksbank, the decision to open an office in Copenhagen was motivated by a desire to 
protect the Riksbank’s credit worthiness (RbFSP No 252 February 18 1875). 
52 RbFP No 169 Mars 25, May 22 1875, RbFSP No 252 June 17, 25 July 9, 12 1875.  
53 RbFSP No 252 October 14 1875. The decision stated that “bank and banker bills of exchange on 
foreign credits were to be sparingly discounted at the lower rate established by the Board.” See also 
Söderlund, E (1964) p. 99).    24
capital, thereby easing the situation on the domestic capital market, by placing bonds 
abroad. By January 1878, the Riksbank was turning down requests for loans even when 
collateral considered to be of high quality by the Board was offered.
54  
The question is to what extent the Riksbank was prepared to inject liquidity to 
support the capital market without regard to its reserve position? Figure 8 below reveals 
that the Riksbank came closest to exceeding its rights to issue during the boom of 1874 
and the recessions of 1875 and 1877. At no time, either during boom or during 
recession, however, did the Bank actually exceed its note issuing limits. Indeed, even 
when refusing to discount bills in early 1878, there was some margin left for further 
note issuance. 
Figure 8: Weekly Data on the Riksbank’s Unutilized Rights to Issue Notes in 1000's of 








































































































Sources: BaU  No 1 1875 – 1880, RdRB 1875 – 1880 
In December of 1878, one of the major Swedish banks, Stockholm Enskilda Bank, 
was subjected to a run. Despite the Bank’s heavy involvement with railroad bonds, it 
managed to survive. The initial run ended on December 7, after King Oscar II made a 
symbolic deposit of ten thousand SEK. When the run re-started and dragged on into 
1879, the Bank received a respite from the fact that it mostly had time deposits payable 
only after six months notice.
55  
                                                 
54 RbFP No 170-172 July 1, November 25 1876, March 22, July 12, November 29 1877, January 15, 24 
1878, RbFSP No 252-253 June 17, July 9, December 16 1875, June 15 1876 July 5, September 24, 
November 15 1877, RbR No 429 December 11 1876. 
55 Nilsson, G.B. (2001) pp. 351-358. In 1879, the National Debt Office cancelled its credits due to a 
shortage of funds and expected future receipts. The effect on Stockholm Enskilda bank was especially 




As pressure mounted, in February 1879 the dominant ”laissez faire” ideal was 
abandoned in order to prevent further deterioration of the credit market. The Minster of 
Finance’s pronouncement that support for the banks would ”free the capital that had 
been made illiquid” implicitly acknowledged that intervention was needed to relieve the 
existing credit crunch. 
The solution was the establishment of a special, time limited, fund to provide the 
banks with lending of last resort. Since railway bonds, for which a functioning 
secondary market no longer existed, had become the major problem, the fund agreed to 
issue loans secured by such bonds. Hence, the Fund was named the Railroad Mortgage 
Fund (Jernvägshypoteksfonden), and was to be administered by the National Debt 
Office.
56 
After months of bureaucratic manoeuvering, the required legislation was finally 
enacted on May 17, 1879. In brief it stated that loans were to be provided against the 
security of railroad bonds, promissary notes or IOUs from Swedish railway companies. 
The total amount of capital at the fund’s disposal amounted to twenty three million 
SEK. At the suggestion of the National Debt Office, unsold bonds from previous 
flotations were to be used to raise the capital as required. This meant that the Fund was 
to first approve loans and then obtain the necessary funds. Credit institutions in need of 
loans were to file applications specifying the amount they wished to borrow, what 
collateral they had to offer and what kind of payment plan they had in mind to the 
National Debt Office no later than June 1, 1880.
57  Formally, the flexibility of the Fund 
was further limited by the fact that the collateral offered had to be evaluated by 
                                                                                                                                               
had a personal debt of 250,000 SEK, collateralized by railroad bonds, to the Office. Having repaid 50,000 
SEK, Wallenberg was allowed extend the rest of his loan and with only half of the collateral originally 
pledged. This after Wallenberg makes reference to this Riksbank credit of 200,000 SEK secured by bonds 
in the same (Gefle-Dala) railroad company (RGKLP No 4462 January 16, 23 1879). 
56 Kprop 1879 No 29 pp. 1, 7-10. One result of the lender of last resort activities during the 1878/79 crisis 
was the consolidation of the commercial banking system at the expense of banking firms and banking 
houses, who declined during this crisis. This development raises the interesting question of the general 
effect of last resort lending on the structure of the credit market (see Boksjö, A. & Lönnborg-Andersson, 
M. (1994)  pp.16-18).  
57 RdSkr No 53 pp. 2-3. The State was to be fully repaid for this commitment and any eventual profit was 
to be used to repay the loans used to build the State railways or other State debts. The Railroad Mortgage 
Fund eventually generated a surplus of just over 155,000 SEK (RGKJHFH No 7907 1894 pp. 3-4, 7). The 
Fund’s upper limit had been reduced from thirty to twenty three million SEK at the instigation of those 
groups in the Parliament who blamed the commercial banks for creating the crisis and who wished to 
devote the saved amounts to alternative, non credit market, approaches to providing lender of last resort 
services. Thus, through the Sågverksegarnas Garantiförening (Saw Mill Owners’ Guarantee 
Association), the saw mill industry was provided with a fund of three million SEK to be lent on the   26
representatives of the Royal Railway Traffic Board (Kungliga Styrelsen för Statens 
Järnvägstrafik) before any loan was granted.
58 
The Law did not prescribe whether the Debt Office was to raise funds by selling 
bonds on the domestic or on the international market. It was thus left at the Office’s 
discretion. It was feared that bonds floated domestically would be used by private 
parties as collateral for international loans. This, in turn, might damage Sweden’s 
crediting standing and make foreign capital unnecessarily expensive.
59 For once, the 
Riksbank was charged with administrating the placement of National Debt Office’s 
bonds and thus of raising capital from foreign banking firms.
60  
Although it can be argued that the Fund was established too late, it unquestionably 
was significant in saving one important bank, Stockholm Enskilda Bank, from 
bankruptcy. The Stockholm Enskilda Bank had already applied for a loan of five million 
SEK even before it had officially started accepting applications. In response, the 
Railroad Mortgage Fund lent the Bank four million SEK, two and half million of which 
were dispersed within a few days of the establishment of the Fund. The first payment of 
one million SEK was made on June 4, 1879. Since the Stockholm Enskilda Bank 
needed funds immediately, the National Debt Office had no time to either evaluate the 
collateral or to raise the money abroad. Instead the Office borrowed the funds to be lent 
from the Riksbank.
61  
By July of 1879, the Fund had approved loans of over four million SEK to the 
Stockholm Enskilda Bank, but the Bank limited it self to four million.
62 By that time, the 
                                                                                                                                               
security of stored timber. The remaining four million SEK were allocated to the purchase of the private 
Hallsberg-Motala-Mjölby railway by the State (StU No 53 pp. 3-5). 
58 RGKLP No 4462 May 26, June 5 1879. All this was done to prevent misuse of the Fund. Nonetheless, 
the railway bonds were valued at close to their nominal value, that is at approximately twice their current 
market value. A special collateral valuation board was also used by the emergency fund established to 
assist the banks during the crisis of 1992.  
59 StU No 46 pp. 9-13, 16-17. The Standing Committee on Supply wanted the National Debt Office to 
raise 86 % of the capital within the country, probably not an optimal solution at a time when credit was in 
short supply.   
60 RGKJHFM No 8514 pp. 23-27 
61 RGKLP No 4462 May 30, June 3 1879, RGKJHFH No 7893 1879 pp. 40-41, RGKJHFM No 8514 p. 
23. In order to lend such a large amount so quickly, the National Debt Office had to violate the 
regulations.  For a time it even accepted the Bank’s own promissary notes as collateral. Two of the 
Offices’s board members noted their reservations in the loan protocol.  
62 Gasslander (1962) pp. 29-30, RGKJHFM No 8514 pp. 23-24, RGKLP No 4462 May 30, July 24, 31 
1879. Once the Fund came into being, Wallenberg switched the railroad bonds he had provided as 
collateral for his personal loans from the National Debt Office and the Riksbank over to his own bank, 




situation on the capital market had started to improve, as can be deduced from the lower 
interest rates charged by the Fund.
63  
Figure 9: Borrowers from the Railroad Mortgage Fund  
Date Granted  Date Paid  Bank  Collaterals (nominal 
value) in percent of loan
Loan Amount (SEK) 
June 3 – July 
24 1879 
June 4 1879 – 
Jan. 31 1880 
Stockholm Enskilda 
Bank 
149% 4 000 000 
June 12 & 





249% 775 000 
June 12 & 
Aug. 7 1879 
June 23 & 
Aug. 16 1879 
Göteborg 
Köpmannabank 
200% 350 000 
June 19 1879  July 5 1879  Göteborg 
Inteckningsgaranti AB 
277% 50 000 
June 19 1879  July 17 1879  Södermanland Enskilda 
Bank 
200% 115 000 
July 24 & Nov. 
13 1879 
Aug. 4 & Dec. 
30 1879 
Kalmar Enskilda Bank  207% 470 000 
Aug. 13 1879 
& May 27 1880 
Sept. 12 1879 
& July 1 1880 
AB Gefle Bank  131% 80 000 
Aug. 21 1879  Oct. 1 1879  Sundsvall Enskilda 
Bank 
111% 540 000 
Oct. 23 1879  Oct. 31 1879  Kristinehamn Enskilda 
Bank 
134% 180 000 
  March 6 1880  Gotland Enskilda Bank  100% 30 000 
June 16 1880  July 1 1880  Wermland Enskilda 
Bank 
350% 1 000 000 
June 16 1880  July 7 1880  Ulricehamn Folkbank  219% 50 000 
July 8 1880  July 26 1880  Skaraborg Län Enskilda 
Bank 
100% 200 000 
Sources: RGKJHFH 1879, 1880, RGKJHFL and RGKLP 1879, 1880 
A total of thirteen banks received loans from the Fund. Over half of the total of 7.56 
million SEK lent, however, went to Stockholm Enskilda Bank alone. That Bank was 
also the last to repay its loans, waiting as long as possible to do so.
64 
The principal financier of the Railroad Mortgage Fund was the Riksbank. At least 1.4 
million SEK were lent directly to the National Debt Office and instantly passed on.
65 In 
                                                                                                                                               
then used to back those loans, while the bonds were offered as collateral when Stockholms Enskilda Bank 
applied for a loan from the Railroad Mortgage Fund (RGKLP No 4462 June 12 1879). 
63 RGKLP No 4462 August 24 1879. In late July, the National Debt Office lowered the rate of interest on 
its loans to the Railroad Mortgage Fund to five percent, since loans at that rate were readily available to 
the Fund from other sources. 
64 In 1890, the account heading for loans from the Fund also was changed from “various borrowers” to 
“Stockholm Enskilda Bank”. RGKJHFH No 7903-7906 1890 pp. 18-19, 1891 pp. 18-19, 1892 pp. 18-19, 
1893 pp. 20-21.  
65 RGKJHFL No 4851 pp. 22-23, 26-27. These payments were one million SEK on June 4 and 400,000 
on October 1 on 1879. They were originally registered as a special entry labeled “The Riksbank”, but this 
was later changed. Since the Riksbank in fact lent to the National Debt Office which, in turn, lent to the 
Fund, it is possible that the total credit provided by the Riksbank exceeded these amounts.     28
addition, the Riksbank bought 3.5 million SEK of National Debt Office bonds issued to 
finance the Fund in 1879.
66 
Although the activities of the Riksbank in connection with credit market difficulties 
were important, the Bank can not be considered to have been a lender of last resort in 
the classical sense. As it made perfectly clear, the principal task of the Riksbank was to 
maintain convertibility. In January of 1878, the Bank refused to provide credit, even 
against the very best collateral, on the grounds that there simply was not enough 
money.
67 It held to the view that its responsibility for the specie standard prevented it 
from committing itself to always providing even very well secured credit.
68  
The Riksbank continued to focus on maintaining the specie standard and, therefore, 
relied on other actors, usually the National Debt Office, to import foreign funds when 
the domestic credit market was in distress.
69 These bond loans were intended primarily 
to finance the domestic infrastructure investments, and lower interest rates was the 
official reason for placing them abroad.
70 Nonetheless, a number of them, such as those 
issued during the recessions of 1890, 1899 and 1907, were closely related to distress on 
the Swedish money markets.
71  
Lender of Last Resort in a Transitional Economy: the Argument Refined 
If lending of last resort is to succeed according to the classical formula, the injection of 
liquidity by the central bank must restore faith in the value of collateralized assets and 
the stability of the financial market. Otherwise it will just lead to an exhaustion of 
central bank reserves. For strong economies with a trusted and sought after currency, 
such as Sterling during the nineteenth century, the best lending of last resort policy is 
surely to stabilize the money stock in accord with the classical view.
72 In these cases, 
                                                 
66 RGKLHFM No 8514 p. 23. In addition to the Riksbank, two other principal actors were instrumental in 
providing funds for the Railroad Mortgage Fund, the banking firm of Ehrlanger & Söhne, Frankfurt am 
Main and C.J. Hambro & Son, London. 
67 RbFP No 172 January 15, 24 1878. 
68 RbR No 430 February 26 1880. In response to Wallenberg’s Parliamentary proposal (No. 37) 
concerning a guaranteed right to borrow from the Riksbank against certain specified types of bonds.    
69 RbFSP No 252 June 15, 29 1876, RbR No 429 April 15 1875, June 26 1876, December 11 1877, 
Schön, L. (2000) pp. 262-263, Simonsson, K.G. (1931) pp. 40-41.  
70 Generally speaking, Swedish interest rates were considerably higher than those in England and 
Germany (Lindahl, E., Dahlgren, E. & Kock, K.  (1937) p. 274). 
71 RbFSP No 252 June 15, 29 1876, RbR No 429 April 15 1875, June 26 1876, December 11 1877, 
Schön, L. (2000) pp. 262-263, Simonsson, K.G. (1931) pp. 40-41.  




however, there is no need to worry about the exchange rate. For a capital importing, 
transitional economy, however, the problem is more complex. 
If a modification of the classical lender of last resort concept is to be suggested for 
transitional economies with fixed exchange rates, it should be that the central bank can 
lend freely during crises only as long as the value of the currency is not under pressure. 
If it is, and maintaining the exchange rate is considered the principal goal of monetary 
policy, then the State should borrow on the international market. Such borrowing does 
not put pressure on the fixed exchange rate. It does, however, raise questions about 
public finance, thus increasing the importance of a generally prudent economic policy. 
There are three reasons why the State as a whole, not just the central bank, should act 
as the lender of last resort: 1) The State is more trustworthy as an international borrower 
because it has the ability to impose taxes, an important collateral for foreign lenders. 
This fact also increases the importance of a well functioning tax system in transitional 
economies. 2) The State as a whole is in a better position to bear the risk of accepting 
the dubious collateral offered to lenders of last resort. The central bank acting alone 
would exchange reserves for collateral of little or even no market value. 3) The State as 
a single actor is better suited to bearing the exchange risk, a risk that foreign lenders 
will not accept. If the State commits itself to borrowing, it is important that fiscal as 
well as central bank policy be directed at preserving the fixed exchange rate. 
Research emphasizing the close relationship between financial and currency crises in 
transitional economies has led some scholars to advocate the creation of an international 
body to function as the lender of last resort. Three assumptions underlie their position: 
1) International capital mobility is beneficial to the development of transitional 
economies, but 2) In times of financial panic markets, especially international ones, 
cease to be rational and they lose their ability to effectively allocate capital and yet, 3) 
The ultimate goal of such countries’ monetary policy remains exchange rate stability.
73  
The question is, how could Sweden, a nineteenth century transitional economy, 
successfully rely on international capital markets in times of crisis? Although the cost 
was higher, it was still possible to borrow on the international market. Is it possible that 
international capital markets have become less rational in the twentieth, than they were 
                                                 
73 Fischer, S. (1999) pp. 88-89, 91, 94-96. Fischer argues that international capital is extremely volatile 
and contagious in the sense of being susceptible to panic. Goodhart adds the assumption that the IMF, or 
some other international body, would be better suited to act as lender of last resort than a regionally 
strong economy, see Goodhart, C.A.E. (1999) pp. 356-358.   30
in the nineteenth, century? That hardly seems possible. One important lesson to be 
drawn from the Swedish experience, however, is that risk sharing is important. Sweden 
was considered an investment option by international lenders because the Swedish State 
bore the risks of currency depreciation and bad collateral. The remaining risk was that 
Sweden would not repay its debts out of future income. The Country’s fiscal policies, 
however, seemed to be in good order, and thus the promise to repay was considered 
trustworthy. Perhaps it is more important for transitional economies to develop sound 
fiscal policies than to create an international lender of last resort.
74 
Conclusions 
There is no doubt that the overarching concern with the specie standard played a role in 
the Riksbank not being required to always provide credit against specified collateral, 
even though the classic view of the lender of last resort required such a commitment. 
Thus, the switch from the silver to the gold standard does not constitute a dividing line 
in the Riksbank’s lender of last resort policy. The massive importation of capital that 
began in the late 1850's made it dangerous for the Riksbank to support the credit market 
by suspending convertibility. A currency devaluation always brought with it large costs 
when the monetary standard was to be re-adopted. The growing foreign debt also meant 
that a depreciated currency would result in more expensive loans. The Swedish ability 
to violate the rules of the classical specie standard thus decreased as the Country 
became increasingly dependent on foreign capital. 
The Riksbank was only able to support the credit market the way it did during the 
crisis of 1857 because as yet there was little foreign debt. Nonetheless, when the 
Riksbank came close to bankruptcy (i.e. close to depreciating the currency), it turned to 
the international capital market. During the crisis of 1878/79, the Riksbank put the 
maintenance of the specie standard first. The Riksbank did initially support the credit 
market during the recession of 1875, but as the crisis continued, it refused to let its 
reserves become exhausted. In both of these crises, the collateral accepted for lending of 
last resort had no market value whatsoever.  
On both occasions, the Riksbank began by supporting the credit market, but as the 
crises dragged on, the Bank turned to the international capital market to raise high 
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powered money. The risks of acting as a lender of last resort, including that of a 
depreciated currency, were borne by the Swedish State. The lesson of this experience 
seems to be that initially the central bank in a transitional economy with a fixed 
exchange rate can respond to a crisis in the classical manner; that is it can use up 
reserves to maintain the money stock. If the crisis persists, however, and the fixed rate 
of exchange has to be defended, then funds must be imported from abroad in order to 
build up reserves. While this is not an entirely original observation, it can be hoped that 
international capital markets are more rational than widely thought and might yield 
better results than an international lender of last resort.   
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